



# Proposed Update of Isolation Precautions Appendix A for Selected High-Consequence Pathogens

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# Agenda

1. Rationale for Update
2. Review of VHF and patient placement recommendations (Appendix A)
3. Review of IPC considerations for select high-consequence pathogens
  - Marburg, CCHF, Lassa, South American Hemorrhagic Fevers, Andes, Nipah
  - Goal: Inform recommendation update for Appendix A
4. Discussion + vote on recommended precautions for each pathogen

# 1. Rationale for Update

# Recent inquiries

- Marburg outbreaks in Equatorial Guinea, Tanzania (2023)
- 2 U.S. patients with Nipah in differential (2023)
- Lassa, CCHF are often in differential for ill returning travelers from endemic regions
- US had imported Andes virus case (person-to-person transmissible hantavirus) (2018)

→ Need for updated recommendations for healthcare infection control precautions

## **2. Review of current VHF PPE and patient placement recommendations**

# Appendix A – Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers

<p>Viral hemorrhagic fevers due to Lassa, Ebola, Marburg, Crimean-Congo fever viruses</p>	<p>Droplet + Contact + Standard</p>	<p>Duration of illness</p>	<p><b>Ebola Virus Disease for Healthcare Workers [2014]</b>  <b>Update:</b> Recommendations for healthcare workers can be found at <a href="#">Ebola For Clinicians</a>. (accessed September 2018).</p> <p>Single-patient room preferred. Emphasize:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. use of sharps safety devices and safe work practices,</li><li>2. hand hygiene;</li><li>3. barrier protection against blood and body fluids upon entry into room (single gloves and fluid-resistant or impermeable gown, face/eye protection with masks, goggles or face shields); and</li><li>4. appropriate waste handling.</li></ol> <p>Use N95 or higher respirators when performing aerosol-generating procedures. Largest viral load in final stages of illness when hemorrhage may occur; additional PPE, including double gloves, leg and shoe coverings may be used, especially in resource-limited settings where options for cleaning and laundry are limited. Notify public health officials immediately if Ebola is suspected [212, 314, 740, 772]. Also see <a href="#">Table 3C</a> for Ebola as a bioterrorism agent.</p>
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# Recommended PPE and Patient Placement for Patients with suspected EVD (stable or “dry” patients)

While evaluating and managing PUIs who are clinically stable and do not have bleeding, vomiting, or diarrhea, healthcare providers should at a minimum wear:

- Fluid-resistant gown that extends to at least mid-calf or single-use (disposable) fluid-resistant coveralls without integrated hood
- Full face shield
- Facemask
- Gloves with extended cuffs. Two pairs of gloves should be worn. At a minimum, outer gloves should have extended cuffs.

Patient Placement:

- Single patient room with closed door
- AIIR for AGPs

# Recommended PPE for unstable/“wet” patients with suspected EVD or confirmed patients with EVD

While evaluating and managing PUIs who are clinically unstable and/or have bleeding, vomiting, or diarrhea, healthcare providers should at a minimum wear:

- Impermeable gown or coverall
- PAPR or N95 respirator
- Examination gloves with extended gloves
- Boot covers (or shoe covers in combination with coverall with integrated socks)
- Apron

Patient Placement:

- Single patient room with closed door
- AIIR for AGPs

# Proposed Appendix A Update

- Propose update for the following pathogens
  - VHF's
    - Marburg
    - Lassa
    - Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF)
    - South American Arenaviruses (Junin, Machupo, Chapare, Guanarito, Sabia)
    - Andes Virus (a species of hantavirus)
  - Nipah Virus
- Review of virus-specific information to inform decision-making on recommended precautions

### **3. Review of IPC considerations for select high-consequence pathogens**

# Appendix A Update - Marburg

Virus	Clinical Illness	Mortality	Modes of P2P transmission	Body fluids	Episodes of occupationally-acquired transmission in healthcare	Proposed PPE and Patient Placement
Marburg	<p>Fever, chills, headache, myalgia, sore throat, nausea, vomiting</p> <p>May progress to multi-organ failure, massive hemorrhage</p>	23-90%	<p>No vaccine or approved treatments available</p> <p>Contact with body fluids – blood, most of all</p>	<p>Remdesivir used as treatment, efficacy unclear</p> <p>Virus has been isolated from blood, urine, throat, liver biopsy (autopsy), eye (anterior chamber)</p>	<p>Yes</p> <p>Insufficient or no PPE (skin contact with body fluids), sharps injuries, mucous membrane exposures</p>	Same as Ebola

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# Appendix A Update – Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever

Virus	Clinical Illness	Mortality	Modes of P2P transmission	Body fluids	Episodes of occupationally-acquired transmission in healthcare	Proposed PPE and Patient Placement
Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF)	Fever, headache, back/joint pain, stomach pain, nausea, vomiting, jaundice  Severe bruising, nosebleeds, uncontrolled bleeding at injection sites	3-30%  No vaccine or approved treatments available	Contact with body fluids  Improper sterilization of medical equipment  Percutaneous inoculation from needles  Possible droplet/aerosol transmission	PCR detected in blood, nasal swab, saliva, urine, stool, vaginal fluid  Viral isolation has been reported from patients/corpses	Yes  Percutaneous and cutaneous transmission  Possible droplet/aerosol transmission	Same as Ebola

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# Appendix A Update – Lassa Fever

Virus	Clinical Illness	Mortality	Modes of P2P transmission	Body fluids	Episodes of occupationally-acquired transmission in healthcare	Proposed PPE and Patient Placement
Lassa	<p>Mild symptoms: flu-like illness</p> <p>Severe illness: hemorrhage, respiratory distress, vomiting, hearing loss, tremors, encephalitis, multi-organ failure</p>	<p>Hospitalized patients' mortality rate: 15-20%</p> <p>Overall mortality rate: 1%</p> <p>Ribavirin used as treatment, efficacy unclear</p> <p>No vaccine available</p>	<p>Prolonged contact in setting of unknown exposure</p> <p>Respiratory droplet or aerosol spread in earlier outbreaks were implicated when source was unknown</p>	<p>Viral culture positive in blood, urine, saliva, and semen</p>	<p>Yes</p> <p>Insufficient or no PPE (skin contact with body fluids)</p>	<p>Same as Ebola</p>

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# Appendix A Update – South American Hemorrhagic Fevers

Virus	Clinical Illness	Mortality	Modes of P2P transmission	Body fluids	Episodes of occupationally-acquired transmission in healthcare	Proposed PPE and Patient Placement
	All: flu-like illness					
South American Hemorrhagic Fevers (Arenaviruses)	Junin: absence of respiratory symptoms	Junin: 15-30%, 1% w/ Rx	Junin: P2P transmission surmised in large-scale outbreaks	Junin: reported from oral swabs, urine, breastmilk, ?sexual transmission	Junin: none	
	Machupo: may develop neurologic/hemorrhagic manifestations	Machupo: 25%	Machupo: P2P transmission demonstrated in 1971, large-scale outbreaks	Machupo: blood/throat swab/post-mortem liver/spleen (viral cx)	Machupo: yes	
	Chapare: may develop ARDS/multiorgan dysfunction	Guanarito: 33%	Guanarito: Unclear; only one case of secondary transmission has been identified	Chapare: 2019 outbreak w/ blood/urine/conjunctival/semen NP/OP +PCR and culture/NGS	Chapare: yes	Same as Ebola
	Guanarito: respiratory symptoms, may develop neurological/hemorrhagic manifestations	Sabia: 50%	Chapare: Yes, via contact with body fluids (all)	Guanarito: not established	Guanarito: none	
	Sabia: may develop multiorgan dysfunction	Only Junin has vaccine (not available in US)	Sabia: not established	Sabia: not established	Sabia: two lab accidents	
	No proven treatments for any					

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# Appendix A Update – Andes

Virus	Clinical Illness	Mortality	Modes of P2P transmission	Body fluids	Episodes of occupationally-acquired transmission in healthcare	Proposed PPE and Patient Placement
Andes	Fever, chills, headaches  Cough, shortness of breath  Respiratory failure Coagulopathy Multiorgan dysfunction	30%  No vaccine/treatment	P2P transmission is well-documented among those with close and prolonged contact to case-patients	Breastmilk (PCR) Blood/serum/PBMC (PCR; viral isolate) Urine (PCR) Respiratory sample (PCR)	Yes  No/incomplete PPE	Gown, single pair of gloves, respirator, eye protection  Patient placement in AIR


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# Appendix A Update – Nipah

Virus	Clinical Illness	Mortality	Modes of P2P transmission	Body fluids	Episodes of occupationally-acquired transmission in healthcare	Proposed PPE and Patient Placement
Nipah	<p>Non-specific prodromal phase (fever, HA, myalgia, dizziness), respiratory symptoms, vomiting</p> <p>Neurological symptoms within 1 week - coma, hyporeflexia, areflexia, segmental myoclonus, seizures</p> <p>Survivors may experience relapse or late-onset encephalitis</p>	<p>40-75%</p> <p>No vaccine or treatment</p>	<p>Contact with body fluids, especially respiratory secretions</p> <p>Prolonged exposure to NiV patient(s), those with respiratory symptoms, and older patients</p> <p>Unclear if NiV<sub>B</sub> may be more P2P-transmissible than NiV<sub>M</sub></p>	<p>Respiratory samples with positive NiV RNA on PCR</p> <p>Viral culture positive from throat, nasal, and urine (NiV<sub>M</sub>)</p>	<p>Yes</p> <p>Absence of any or minimal PPE</p>	<p>If clinically stable without vomiting (suspect Nipah): gown, single pair of gloves, respirator, eye protection</p> <p>If clinically unstable (suspect Nipah) or confirmed Nipah: same as Ebola “wet” precautions</p> <p>Patient placement in AIIR</p>

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# Appendix A Update – Nipah (2)

Virus	Clinical Illness	Mortality	Modes of P2P transmission	Body fluids	Episodes of occupationally-acquired transmission in healthcare	Proposed PPE and Patient Placement
Nipah	<p>Non-specific prodromal phase (fever, HA, myalgia, dizziness), respiratory symptoms, vomiting</p> <p>Neurological symptoms within 1 week - coma, hyporeflexia, areflexia, segmental myoclonus, seizures</p> <p>Survivors may experience relapse or late-onset encephalitis</p>	<p>40-75%</p> <p>No vaccine or treatment</p>	<p>Contact with body fluids, especially respiratory secretions</p> <p>Prolonged exposure to NiV patient(s), those with respiratory symptoms, and older patients</p> <p>Unclear if NiV<sub>B</sub> may be more P2P-transmissible than NiV<sub>M</sub></p>	<p>Respiratory samples with positive NiV RNA on PCR</p> <p>Viral culture positive from throat, nasal, and urine (NiV<sub>M</sub>)</p>	<p>5 May Corridor outside CT room</p> 	<p>If clinically stable without vomiting (suspect Nipah): gown, single pair of gloves, respirator, eye protection</p> <p>If clinically unstable (suspect Nipah) or confirmed Nipah: same as Ebola “wet” precautions</p> <p>Patient placement in AIIR</p>

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**Discussion + Vote**



# Appendix A Update – Marburg (2)

Virus	Clinical Illness	Mortality	Modes of P2P transmission	Body fluids	Episodes of occupationally-acquired transmission in healthcare	Proposed PPE and Patient Placement
Marburg	<p>Fever, chills, headache, myalgia, sore throat, nausea, vomiting</p> <p>May progress to multi-organ failure, massive hemorrhage</p>	<p>23-90%</p> <p>No vaccine or approved treatments available</p> <p>Remdesivir used as treatment, efficacy unclear</p>	<p>Contact with body fluids – blood, most of all</p>	<p>Virus has been isolated from blood, urine, throat, liver biopsy (autopsy), eye (anterior chamber)</p>	<p>Yes</p> <p>Insufficient or no PPE (skin contact with body fluids), sharps injuries, mucous membrane exposures</p>	<p>Same as Ebola</p>

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# Discussion + Vote on Proposed Update for Marburg

- **Proposal:** Change recommended PPE and placement for Marburg to be same as recommended for Ebola
- **If change is accepted:**
  - Appendix A will be updated to refer to Ebola guidance
  - Ebola guidance will also be updated to include other pathogens to which it applies in addition to Ebola

# Appendix A Update – Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (2)

Virus	Clinical Illness	Mortality	Modes of P2P transmission	Body fluids	Episodes of occupationally-acquired transmission in healthcare	Proposed PPE and Patient Placement
Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF)	Fever, headache, back/joint pain, stomach pain, nausea, vomiting, jaundice  Severe bruising, nosebleeds, uncontrolled bleeding at injection sites	3-30%  No vaccine or approved treatments available	Contact with body fluids  Improper sterilization of medical equipment  Percutaneous inoculation from needles  Possible droplet/aerosol transmission	PCR detected in blood, nasal swab, saliva, urine, stool, vaginal fluid  Viral isolation has been reported from patients/corpses	Yes  Percutaneous and cutaneous transmission  Possible droplet/aerosol transmission	Same as Ebola

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# Discussion + Vote on Proposed Update for CCHF

- **Proposal:** Change recommended PPE and placement for CCHF to be same as recommended for Ebola
- **If change is accepted:**
  - Appendix A will be updated to refer to Ebola guidance
  - Ebola guidance will also be updated to include other pathogens to which it applies in addition to Ebola

# Appendix A Update – Lassa Fever (2)

Virus	Clinical Illness	Mortality	Modes of P2P transmission	Body fluids	Episodes of occupationally-acquired transmission in healthcare	Proposed PPE and Patient Placement
Lassa	<p>Mild symptoms: flu-like illness</p> <p>Severe illness: hemorrhage, respiratory distress, vomiting, hearing loss, tremors, encephalitis, multi-organ failure</p>	<p>Hospitalized patients' mortality rate: 15-20%</p> <p>Overall mortality rate: 1%</p> <p>Ribavirin used as treatment, efficacy unclear</p> <p>No vaccine available</p>	<p>Prolonged contact in setting of unknown exposure</p> <p>Respiratory droplet or aerosol spread in earlier outbreaks were implicated when source was unknown</p>	<p>Viral culture positive in blood, urine, saliva, and semen</p>	<p>Yes</p> <p>Insufficient or no PPE (skin contact with body fluids)</p>	<p>Same as Ebola</p>

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# Discussion + Vote on Proposed Update for Lassa

- **Proposal:** Change recommended PPE and placement for Lassa to be same as recommended for Ebola
- **If change is accepted:**
  - Appendix A will be updated to refer to Ebola guidance
  - Ebola guidance will also be updated to include other pathogens to which it applies in addition to Ebola

# Appendix A Update – South American Hemorrhagic Fevers (2)

Virus	Clinical Illness	Mortality	Modes of P2P transmission	Body fluids	Episodes of occupationally-acquired transmission in healthcare	Proposed PPE and Patient Placement
	All: flu-like illness					
South American Hemorrhagic Fevers (Arenaviruses)	Junin: absence of respiratory symptoms	Junin: 15-30%, 1% w/ Rx	Junin: P2P transmission surmised in large-scale outbreaks	Junin: reported from oral swabs, urine, breastmilk, ?sexual transmission	Junin: none	
	Machupo: may develop neurologic/hemorrhagic manifestations	Machupo: 25%	Machupo: P2P transmission demonstrated in 1971, large-scale outbreaks	Machupo: blood/throat swab/post-mortem liver/spleen (viral cx)	Machupo: yes	
	Chapare: may develop ARDS/multiorgan dysfunction	Chapare: 60%	Guanarito: Unclear; only one case of secondary transmission has been identified	Chapare: 2019 outbreak w/ blood/urine/conjunctival/semen NP/OP +PCR and culture/NGS	Chapare: yes	Same as Ebola
	Guanarito: respiratory symptoms, may develop neurological/hemorrhagic manifestations	Guanarito: 33%	Chapare: Yes, via contact with body fluids (all)	Guanarito: not established	Guanarito: none	
	Sabia: may develop multiorgan dysfunction	Sabia: 50%	Sabia: not established	Sabia: not established	Sabia: two lab accidents	
		Only Junin has vaccine (not available in US)				
		No proven treatments for any				

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# Discussion + Vote on Proposed Update for South American Hemorrhagic Fevers

- **Proposal:** Change recommended PPE and placement for South American Hemorrhagic Fevers to be same as recommended for Ebola
- **If change is accepted:**
  - Appendix A will be updated to refer to Ebola guidance
  - Ebola guidance will also be updated to include other pathogens to which it applies in addition to Ebola

# Appendix A Update – Andes (2)

Virus	Clinical Illness	Mortality	Modes of P2P transmission	Body fluids	Episodes of occupationally-acquired transmission in healthcare	Proposed PPE and Patient Placement
Andes	Fever, chills, headaches  Cough, shortness of breath  Respiratory failure Coagulopathy Multiorgan dysfunction	30%  No vaccine/treatment	P2P transmission is well-documented among those with close and prolonged contact to case-patients	Breastmilk (PCR) Blood/serum/PBMC (PCR; viral isolate) Urine (PCR) Respiratory sample (PCR)	Yes  No/minimal PPE	Same as Ebola “dry” precautions with the exception of: respirator, single pair of gloves and patient placement in AIIR  Patient placement in AIIR

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# Discussion + Vote on Proposed Update for Andes

- **Proposal:**
  - Same as Ebola “dry” precautions with the exception of: respirator, single pair of gloves and patient placement in AIIR
- **If change is accepted:**
  - Andes would be added to Appendix A as above

# Appendix A Update – Nipah (3)

Virus	Clinical Illness	Mortality	Modes of P2P transmission	Body fluids	Episodes of occupationally-acquired transmission in healthcare	Proposed PPE and Patient Placement
Nipah	<p>Non-specific prodromal phase (fever, HA, myalgia, dizziness), respiratory symptoms, vomiting</p> <p>Neurological symptoms within 1 week - coma, hyporeflexia, areflexia, segmental myoclonus, seizures</p> <p>Survivors may experience relapse or late-onset encephalitis</p>	<p>40-75%</p> <p>No vaccine or treatment</p>	<p>Contact with body fluids, especially respiratory secretions</p> <p>Prolonged exposure to NiV patient(s), those with respiratory symptoms, and older patients</p> <p>Unclear if NiV<sub>B</sub> may be more P2P-transmissible than NiV<sub>M</sub></p>	<p>Respiratory samples with positive NiV RNA on PCR</p> <p>Viral culture positive from throat, nasal, and urine (NiV<sub>M</sub>)</p>	<p>Yes</p> <p>Absence of any or minimal PPE</p>	<p>If clinically stable without vomiting (suspect Nipah): same as Ebola “dry” precautions with exception of single pair of gloves, respirator, and patient placement in AIIR</p> <p>If clinically unstable or confirmed Nipah: same as Ebola “wet” precautions and patient placement in AIIR</p>

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# Discussion + Vote on Proposed Update for Nipah

- **Proposal**
  - If clinically stable without vomiting (suspect Nipah): same as Ebola “dry” precautions with exception of single pair of gloves, respirator, and patient placement in AIIR
  - If clinically unstable or confirmed Nipah: same as Ebola “wet” precautions and patient placement in AIIR
- **If change is accepted:**
  - Nipah would be added to Appendix A as above

**Thank you!**

# Acknowledgments

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**Extra slide**

# Key references

## Marburg

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# Key references CCHF

## CCHF

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## South American Hemorrhagic Fevers

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